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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WHITING BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
M & S CONSTRUCTION AND
ENGINEERING COMPANY, a
corporation, KENT HOYT, SMITH
WELDING AND STEEL, et al,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
10390

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF TI-IE KIND OF CASE
This case was commenced by Whiting Brothers Construction Company, Inc., a building contractor, against
M& S Construction and Engineering Company, a defaulting subcontractor, and various other defendants
primarily consisting of unpaid claimants who furnished
labor or materials at the request of M & S, seeking to
determine the nature, validity and priority of the various
claims and specifically offering to pay claims which were
perfected against it pursuant to the provisions of 40
U.s.c. Sec 270b (commonly called the "Miller Act").
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was argued to the lower court on Motioni
for Summary Judgment filed by defendants Kent Hort
and Smith Welding and Steel. Upon oral argument t~e
court granted Summary Judgment against plaintiff anJ
in favor of defendant Hoyt in the amount of $565.00, ana
in favor of defendant Smith in the amount of $361.0u,
together with interest, costs and attorneys' fees for botn
parties.

•

.
•

:

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal as to both parties of tne /
Summary Judgments granted against it. No other partie1 j
named in the lower court are involved in this appeal. j
STATEMENT OF FACTS

I

On the 5th day of July, 1963, an agreement was
executed entitled "Standard Form of Subcontract" whm·
in plaintiff appeared as prime contractor and defendant
M & S Construction and Engineering Company (herein·
after called "M & S") appeared as subcontractor. SaiJ
defendant agreed to perform certain work in construe·
tion of runways and facilities at the municipal airport at
Cedar City, Utah. The subcontract was made pursuant
to plaintiff's contract with Cedar City Corporation and
the Federal Aviation Agency under a contract designated
F.A.A.P. #9-42-024-04 (R.2). Pursuant to 40 U.S.C
§270a, plaintiff furnished a bond issued by The Trave~e!l ·
Indemnity Company, who is not a party to the actwt .
(R.4).
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Defendant M & S defaulted m performance of its
obligations, and so far as may be applicable on this appeal, failed to pay many of its suppliers, including the
labor and material claims of defendants Kent Hoyt and
Smith Welding and Steel (hereinafter called "Hoyt" and
"Smith", respectively). Plaintiff has refused to pay said
claims for the principal reasons: ( 1) Plaintiff has no
express or implied contractual obligation toward said
defendants, and (2) Plaintiff obtained a bond for payment of claims in accordance with the provisions of 40
U.S.C. Section 270a, but said defendants failed to file a
notice of claim with plaintiff within the statutory period
of ninety days. Plaintiff has been willing to make payments of valid claims which have been perfected under
the bonding statutes (R.7 and 8). It is admitted, for
purposes of this appeal, that defendant Hoyt furnished
materials of the reasonable value of $565.00 during the
period September 17, 1963 to December 17, 1963 (R. 16)
and defendant Smith furnished labor and materials of
the value of $361.00 from August 1, 1963 to September
25, 1963 (R. 22).
Subsequently, said defendants filed Motions for Summary Judgment with attached Affidavits (R.14-26), and
the case was heard by Judge Aldon J. Anderson on April
22, 1965. Oral arguments were presented to the court
and Judge Anderson granted the Motions. After filing
a Notice of Appeal, plaintiff's counsel attempted to
obtain a transcript of the record made of the oral arguments and oral ruling of the court, but found that no
record had been made by the reporter. Accordingly, the
record of the court's ruling consists of the minute entry
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(R.27) and the judgments (R.28-31). Evidently th
clerk's minute entry is in error in speaking of the plain,tiff':
Motion, where in fact it was the Motion of defendant>
Hoyt and Smith. Counsel for plaintiff represents, notwithstanding the record does not clearly reflect it, that
Judge Anderson specifically announced from the bench :
that he believed the defendants appearing in this appeal !
were misled by the provisions of the letter sent by LaJ !
Vegas counsel of plaintiff to said defendants under date of i
December 26, 1963 (see duplicate copies of the letter at :
R.19-21 and R.24-26). Summary Judgment was granted i
on that basis. The effect of that letter is, therefore, a '
primary but not exclusive ground for this appeal. Tiie
issue to be decided by this Court is whether or not defendants Hoyt and Smith perfected their claims against I
plaintiff and the bonding company or were so misled hr 1'
the letter of December 26, 1963 and other circumstances,
that in the exercise of reasonable prudence the.y were
induced by plaintiff not to file claims as reqmred by
I
statute.

I
f

I

I
i

ARGUMENT

Ii

POINT 1.

;I

DEFENDANTS HOYT AND SMITH FAILE~ /
TO FILE NOTICE OF THEIR CLAIM WITHTh i
NINETY DAYS AFTER COMPLETION OF THEIB
WORK AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE.
.

I

The construction project involved in this case w~ :
financed largely through Federal funds and by law wai ;
. .
A
By reason
supervised by the Federa1 Av1at1on gency.
,:
thereof, the Federal law of contract procedures I11Ul· ·

i

1._
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apply. The relevant statutes are explicit as to the issues
particularly involved in this appeal. The act commonly
known as the "Miller Act", found in Section 270a of
Tide 40, U.S.C.A. requires a sufficient bond for faithful
performance of any public works construction. Section
270b sets forth the terms and conditions under which
a materialman can enforce his rights a,gainst the bonding
company:
(a) Every person who furnished labor or material
in the prosecution of the work provided for in
such contract, in respect of which a payment bond
is furnished under section 270a of this title and
who has not been paid in full therefor before the
expiration of a period of ninety days after the
day on which the last of the labor was done or
performed by him or material was furnished or
supplied by him for which such claim is made,
shall have the right to sue on such payment bond
for the amount, or the balance thereof, unpaid at
the time of institution of such suit and to prosecute said action to final execution and judgment
for the sum or sums justly due him; Provided,
however, That any person having direct contrac-

tual relationship with a subcontractor but no
contractual relationship express or implied with
the contractor furnishing said payment bond shall
have a right of action upon the said payment bond
upon giving written notice to said contractor
within ninety days from the date on which such
Person did or performed the last of the labor or
furnished or supplied the last of the material for
which such claim is made, stating with substantial
accuracy the amount claimed and the name of the
party to whom the material was furnished or supplied or for whom the labor was done or performed.
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Sue~ notice skall be served by mailing the same bi
registered mail, postage prepaid, in an envelop;
addressed to the contractor at any place he mai _ ·
tai1_zs an offi_ce or conducts his business or /:11
residence, or m any manner in which the Unitej
~tates marshal. of _the district in which the publi;
improvement is situated is authorized by law to '
I
serve summons.
(40 U.S.C.A., page 435) (Emphasis supplied)

I

We may note in passing that the principles of law
governing this appeal would be identical even if Utah
law were applicable, for Section 14-1-5, U.C.A., 19)1,
requires a sufficient surety bond for public works construction and Section 14-1-6, U.C.A., 1953, sets forth
the right of action on the bond in terms obviously similar
to the Federal statute:

!
!

;
j

Every claimant who has furnished labor or material ,
in the pro~cution of the w?rk provided for in such
contract m respect of which a payment bond ~
furnished under this act, and who has not been p~ia
in full therefor before the expiration of a peno<l
of ninety days after the day on which the last .of :
the labor was done or performed by him or ~aterial I'
was furnished or supplied by him for which sucn I
claim is made, shall have the right to sue on sucn 1
payment bond for the amount, or the balance ~here·
of, unpaid at the time of institution of such suitaia
to prosecute such action to final judgment forte ,
sum or sums justly due him and have exe~ution i
ther_eon; p~ovided, however, that_ any ~uch_cla1111:i'. ;
having a direct contractual relationship w1thas ·
contractor of the contractor furnishin~ sue~ P~:: i
men! bond but no contractual relat1omhiP , :
pressed or implied with such contractor sha/l nr, :

I

I
I

J

j'
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havr a right of action upon such payment bond
unless he has given written notice to such contractor within ninety days from the date on which
such claimant Performed the last of the labor or
furnished or supplied the last of the material for
which such claim is made, stating with substantial
accuracy the amount claimed and the name of the
person to whom the material was furnished or
supplied or for whom the labor was done or performed. Each notice shall be served by mailing
the same by registered or certified mail, postage
prepaid, in an envelope addressed to the contractor
at any place he maintains an office or conducts
his business or at his residence.
(Emphasis supplied)
The relevant facts governing this point are undisputed. Defendants Hoyt and Smith expressly admit in
their respective Affidavits that they did not give the
written notice as provided by statute (R.18 and R.22).
By reason of those clear admissions, the failure of the
defendants to comply with the statute need not be belabored further. Suffice it to say that defendants expressly failed to perfect their respective claims against
the plaintiff and the bonding company. Their right of
action is prima facie defeated.
Notwithstanding that The Travelers Indemnity
Company, the bondsman of plaintiff in this matter, is
not before the court, it is appropriate to specify that the
prime contractor and the surety are in an identical position
so far as concerns the requirement of notice. In holding
the notice requirement to be a strict condition precedent
to a right of action, the court in Bowden v. United States,
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(9th Cir. 1956) 239 F. 2d 572, cert. den. 353 U.S. 95/
77 S. C. 864, 1 L. Ed. 2d 909, stated:
'
... The statute providing the cause of action on the
bond, 40 U.S.C.A. Sec. 270b(a) makes no distinction between the liability of the contractor and
that of his surety. Recovery can be had against
neither unless the condition precedent to the existence of the right of action-giving of the statutory
notice-has been complied with.
(239 F. 2d, page 578)
POINT 2.
BY THE LETTER OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL
DEFENDANTS HOYT AND SMITH WERE PUT ON
NOTICE THAT BY REASON OF FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES THEY MUST TAKE STEPS TO PRO·
TECT THEIR CLAIMS.
Plaintiff submits that defendants Hoyt and Smitn
were not misled to their detriment by any act or omi~ion
of plaintiff. Plaintiff's actions, though honestly intendea
and charitably motivated, should have constituted a warn·
ing to defendants.
The lower court granted Summary Judgments
against plaintiff solely on the basis of the letter dat~
December 26, 1963, written by plaintiff's Las Vegas
counsel to all persons who had furnished labor and ma·
terials on the Cedar City airport project (R.19-20·
Neither the Affidavit of Hoyt (R.16) nor the Af·
fidavit of Smith (R.22) alleges that the letter of Decem·
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ber 26, 1963, induced said defendants not to file the
notice required by statute. As respects defendant Smith,
the letter could have had no effect whatever since the
ninety day period for filing his claim had expired prior
to the date of actual receipt of the letter. His services
and material were completed September 25, 1963, and
his ninety day period for filing the notice would have
expired before December 24, 1963 (R.22). He admits
that the letter in question was not received until December
27, 1963 (R.23).
The very nature of the letter, that it was duplicated
in quantities with the addressee left blank, and then
mailed to the various defendants, clearly suggests the
purpose of the letter, to wit: an explanation to all persons
who had furnished labor or materials to the job that the
subcontractor could not pay its bills. An analysis of this
"red flag"letter leads to the inescapable conclusion that
no reasonably prudent businessman could be misled by
that letter to believe that he was not obligated to file his
notice of claim against the prime contractor and the bond
in order to perfect his rights in accordance with law. The
fifth and last p·aragraph of page 1 of said letter specifically
states that M & S had assigned the contract proceeds to
the Clearfield State Bank, thus suggesting to the materialmen receiving the letter that no funds whatever may be
available to pay the creditors. Such funds as Whiting
Brothers had were to be paid to the bank, and Whiting
Brothers ha.cl no way of knowing which of the materialmen
had been paid by the bank, unless the unpaid claimants
gave proper notice. The first two paragraphs of page 2
specify the difficulties arising from federal tax lien prior-
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ities.
The third paragraph of page 2 describes legal u~
·
.
m the nature of an interpleader which was then contem.
plated but not actually filed until nine months later, The
very prospect of relying on a court to determine the
rights and priorities of the various materialmen should
have prompted a prudent businessman to file his notice
of claim as required by law.
More importantly, the fifth paragraph of page 2of
said letter specifically states that Whiting Brothers owe1
nothing to the ma terialmen, but would hold such fun~
as may be due M & S only to determine who of the bank
and other claimants was entitled to the money and in what
amounts. Again, every materialman is deemed to have
constructive knowledge of the law that a claim cannot
be perfected against the prime contractor and its surety
without giving the ninety days notice specified in the
Miller Act. What more clear language could plaintiff
reasonably use to warn the creditors of the possibility
of losing their claims than to state that Whiting Brother)
owes nothing and that funds held belonging to M &Sare
subject to prior creditors, including the Clearfield State
Bank and the United States of America. And, if that
were not enough, Whiting Brothers' letter firmed up the
necessity of the materialmen taking their own steps by
stating in the first paragraph on page 3 of said letter that
Whiting Brothers itself has a claim against M & Sof an
unknown amount by reason of the default of M& ~
(R.21). As a matter of fact, many creditors filed notiCI)
of their claim by registered letter immediately after :e· I
ceiving the December 26th communication from plai~: i
tiff's Las Vegas counsel. The specific failure of defendan,,

1

I

I
j

I
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Hoyt and Smith to take steps necessary for perfection of
their claim is the very reason they should not be allowed to
have judgment against plantiff contrary to law.
Many authorities with factual circumstances closely
analogous to the case at bar firmly support the strict
statutory requirement that a materialman give proper
notice to the prime contractor. The notice contemplated
as a con di ti on precedent to a right of action is more than
just a writing showing the amount due, but must affirmatively allege that the creditor is making claim
against the prime contractor. As previously mentioned,
notice to the prime contractor sets up the right of action
against the surety. The cases discussed below firmly
establish that even if the prime contractor has knowledge
that some materialmen have not been paid and has knowledge of the amount of the claim, no liabilities of the prime
contractor or its surety can be imposed unless the materialmen have taken specific steps in writing to inform the
prime contractor that a claim is being presented against
it and the surety.

A most convincing case is USA for use of Charles R.
Joyce CS Son, Inc. v. Baebner, Inc., (2d Cir. 1964) 326 F.

2d 556. In an action on a Miller Act bond by a subcontractor's materialman, the court held three written communications from the plaintiff to be insufficient notice
of claim to the prime contractor. The first letter referred
to an alleged understanding that the prime contractor
Would guarantee payment of liabilities accumulated by
the subcontractor, to which the prime contractor replied
denying any agreement to guarantee payments. The
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next letter referred to the amount claimed by the materialman, without any indication that he was looking to the
prime contractor for payment. The third letter, from
the materialman's lawyer, discussed the dispute regarding
payment of the account and alleged an understanding
that final settlement could not be reached until satisfactory provision had been made for payment of the material.
man's claim.
The court stated and held:
This has very naturally been construed by the
courts as requiring that "the writing must inform
the prime contractor, expressly or by implication,
that the supplier is looking to the contractor for
payment of the subcontractor's bill." Bowden v.
United States, 9 Cir., 1956, 239 F. 2d 572, at page
577, citing numerous authorities. The ruling in
this Circuit is the same. United States for Use and
Benefit of]. A. Edwards f5 Co. v. Thompson Construction Corp., 2 Cir., 1959, 273 F. 2d 873, 876.
True it is that the Act is to be liberally construed.
But to eliminate the minimal requirement just set
forth would entirely emasculate the statute.
Applying this test, and disregarding the fact that
the first letter was sent before the completion of
the work to be performed by Joyce, the letters
are plainly insufficient. They do not even int~te
or suggest that any claim is being asserted ~gai11St
the prime contractor or that Joyce is look0g .~l
the prime contractor for the payment of his bi ·
(326 F. 2d page 558)

In USA for the use of Carter-Schneider-Nelson, Inc.

v. Campbell, (9th Cir. 1961) 293 F. 2d 816, cert. den.
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368 U.S. 987, 82 S. C. 601, 7 L. Ed. 2d 529, the court

considered various problems including the sufficiency
of an alleged written notice. In addition to other problems
regarding the notice, the court declared that a copy of a
letter from the ma terialman addressed to the surety on
one of the jobs involved was sent to the prime contractor.
Even though the letter asks the surety about its intentions
regarding payment of the claim, the letter was held insufficient as notice for the reason that it did not inform
the prime contractor that the materialman was looking
to it for payment.
One of the landmark cases which is often cited is
applicable here. The court in USA for use of American
Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corporation v. Northwest
Engineering Company, (8th Cir. 1941) 122 F. 2d 600,
affirmed the trial court's decision that a written notice
of claim is jurisdictional under the statute, and that it
cannot be waived by a verbal denial of liability on the
part of the general contractor. On appeal the plaintiff
claimed sufficient notice was given by reason of invoice
copies furnished to the subcontractor as the materials were
being supplied, which invoices the subcontractor in turn
gave to the general contractor for use in arriving at the
estimated payments which the government was to make
during construction progress. In finding that such invoice
copies were not notice of a claim being presented against
the prime contractor or its surety, the court made the
following significant statements:
... We are unable, from this language, to arrive at
any other conclusion than that the giving of a written notice must be held to be mandatory, as a strict
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condit.ion precedent to the existence of any right
?f action upon the payment bond. Since the right
is pur~ly a statutory ~rant, °?~gress necessarily
could impose such creatmg conditions as it saw fit
While the statute uses the general term "notice';
its other language clearly shows that it is intended
to be, in legal effect, the presentation of a claim.
That presentation is required to be made in written
form, "stating with substantial accuracy the
amount claimed and the name of the party to
whom the material was furnished or supplied or
for whom the labor was done or performed".
Since the statute gives a materialman or laborer no
cause or right of action upon the bond until such a
written notice has been furnished, it follows that
the mere assertion of the contractor in this case
that nothing was owing to the subcontractor, and
that there was accordingly no liability to plaintiff,
or any other declaration that might have been
made, could not constitute an effectual waiver of
the necessity for furnishing a written notice under
the statute....
. . . They could accordingly not be treated as a
substitute for the written notice of claim which
the statute imposed as a condition precedent to any
right of action upon the bond.
( 122 F. 2d, pages 602-60 3)
The claim of defendant Hoyt is specifically defeated
by a 4th Circuit U. S. Court of Appeals decision in which
an assignment similar to that alleged by Hoyt was de·
dared to be insufficient notice of claim. In USA for the
use of Henry Walke v. Van De Riet, et al, (4th Cir. 1963)
316 F. 2d 912, the financially unstable subcontractor
sought to assure payment of its materialmen, including
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plaintiff, by executing an assignment of the contract proceeds which recited the contract between the prime contractor and the United States. The form of the assignment
was specifically approved in writing by the prime contractor. At the time of the assignment no materials had
actually been furnished, and therefore, no claim was actually due. During the performance of the contract the
prime contractor paid some sums of money to the plaintiff
by reason of the assignment.
The prime contractor was not aware that the full
amount of the materialman's claim had not been paid until
long after the ninety day notice period had expired. There
was no contract, express or implied, whereby the prime
contractor agreed it would be responsible for the claims
of the ma terialman.
The court specifically found that a letter from the
prime contractor to the materialman acknowledging receipt of the assignment and the approval of the assignment by the prime contractor, did not constitute a notice
of claim to the prime contractor, nor was the acceptance
and approval of the assignment an acknowledgment of a
claim or a waiver of any further notice of unpaid claims.
The notice being insufficient, the materialman could not
sustain a claim against the contractor or the surety.
Further support for the position of plaintiff is given
in Bowden v. United States, (9th Cir. 1956) 239 F. 2d
572, cert. den. 353 U. S. 957, 77 S. C. 864, 1 L. Ed. 2d
909. In that case the prime contractor on a government
project received a letter from a subcontractor authorizing
the prime contractor to make checks payable jointly to the
subcontractor and certain specified creditors who were
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named in the letter The complaining creditor, the largest
claim listed in the letter, did not take any steps in the
nature of filing notice with the prime contractor that
payment had not been made of its claim within ninety
days after completion of the work. The lower court
found in favor of the claimant but was reversed on appeal, with instructions to dismiss the appeal. In determining the effect of the letter, the court said:
We think the teaching of the cases which have
dealt most soundly with questions regarding the
sufficiency of notice when it is required to be
given by Section 270b(a) may be fairly summarized as follows: The giving of the written notice
specified by the statute is a. condition precedent
to the right of a supplier to sue on the payment
bond; the writing must be sent or presented to the
prime contractor by or on the authority of the
supplier; and the writing must inform the prime
contractor, expressly or by implication, that the
supplier is looking to the contractor for payment
of the subcontractor's bill. . . .
{239 F. 2d, page 577)
In answer to the claimant's argument that the Miller
Act is remedial and should be liberally construed, and that
the prime contractor possessed all of the knowledge it
would have had if the materialman himself had given
notice, the court replied:
. . . But this argument goes too far, too fast. It
overlooks entirely the fact that the statute makes
the requirement of written notice from the sup·
plier a condition precedent to a right of action.on
the bond; and no rule of liberality in construction ,
can justify reading out of the statute the very '
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condition which Congress laid down as prerequisite
to the cause of action.
(239 F. 2d, page 577)
A similar holding is seen in USA for the use of Old
Dominion Iron fJ Steel Corp. v. Massachusetts Bonding
and Insurance Company, (3rd Cir. 1959) 272 F. 2d 73.
The defaulting subcontractor wrote a letter to the prime
contractor stating that a certain sum was due a material
supplier and that the subcontractor would indemnify the
prime contractor against any materialman's claim. The
subcontractor then wrote to the materialman stating that
it had gone so far as to list its unpaid account with the
prime contractor so that the interests of the supplier would
be protected. The unpaid materialman having taken no
action to give notice to the prime contractor within the
ninety day statutory period, the court held that by reason
thereof it was precluded from realizing any benefits of
the Miller Act. The subcontractor's letter was not suf·
ficient notice.

In USA for the use of J. A. Edwards

Co., Inc. v.
Thompson Construction Corp., {2d Cir. 1959) 273 F. 2d
873, cert. den. 362 U. S. 951, 80 S. C. 864, 4 L. Ed. 2d
869, 78 ALR 2d 421, the court also considered the effect
of a letter from the subcontractor authorizing the prime
contractor to make payments to a material supplier, said
letter being construed to be an assignment. The court
held that such letter was insufficient as notice to the
prime contractor that the supplier would look to it for
payment. In response to an argument of the supplier, the
court stated:
fJ
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... It says in its brief (p. 12) that "In the factual
setting here presented, it would require the exercise
of very little imagination on the part of the general
contractor Thompson to tie in the letter with the
furnishing of electrical material by the use plaintiff under the prime Government contract." \Vie
think the need for exercising imagination was what
the notice provision of the Miller Act was intended
to prevent. . . .
(273 F. 2d, page 877)
Notwithstanding some additional contacts between
the supplier and the prime contractor, the court held no
notice was given which was sufficient to perfect the claim
of the supplier against the prime contractor or the bonding
company.
Finally, some applicable pronouncements of the aplicable law are found in USA for the Use of Davison v.
York Electric Construction Co., (D.C. N.D. 1960) 184
F. Supp. 520, 25 F.R.D. 478. The unpaid materialman
admittedly gave no notice to the prime contractor within
the ninety day period required by the Miller Act. It
relied on the fact that the prime contractor received
copies of invoices as to all materials furnished, which had
to be approved by the prime contractor. The court held
(I) there was no express or implied contractual relationship between the supplier and the prime contractor, and
(2) the furnishing of invoices was not sufficient to con·
stitute the notice required by the Miller Act. The court
relied on the plain wording of the statute evidencing the
intent of Congress in making the notice a prerequisite. to
the cause of action, and cited some of the cases which
have hereinabove been discussed.
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As applied to the facts of this case the foregoing
authorities clearly establish that defendant Hoyt has no
claim against plaintiff or its surety for the reasons: ( 1) No
written notice of the unpaid claim was given to plaintiff
by Hoyt in the manner required by statute; (2) the
alleged assignment of contract proceeds from M & S to
Hoyt did not constitute notice to plaintiff, even when
received by plaintiff's agent, that Hoyt was looking to
plaintiff and its surety for payment, except through the
assignment; ( 3) the assignment was possibly invalid by
reason of the prior assignment to the Clearfield State
Bank; and ( 4) the assignment was ineffective because
of the offset claim of plaintiff itself, in view of the default of M & S which was known to the parties.
POINT 3.
DEFENDANTS HOYT AND SMITH HAVE NO
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF.
Defendants Hoyt and Smith had no written agreement with plaintiff which would obligate plaintiff to
make payment of their claims. The record does not even
suggest any such agreement. No provision of law creates
an agreement between the parties absent any intent of
the parties to effect a contract. It is expressly admitted
by defendants Hoyt and Smith that they supplied their
materials and performed their labor "at the instance and
request of the representative of M & S Construction and
Engineering Company" (R.16 and R.22). On construction contracts of the nature involved in this case, it is
very customary as a matter of business practice that sup-
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~liers deal directly with the subcontractor who has specif-

ically requested their labor and materials. There is no
reason either in logic or practicality which would compel
a subcontractor's material supplier to deal directly with
the prime contractor on a bonded government construction project. At the time defendants Hoyt and Smith
entered into their agreements with M & S Construction
and Engineering Company, plaintiff neither knew or
needed to know of the arrangements between said parties.
Hoyt and Smith looked to M & S, their contracting party,
for payment of claims. They were informed by the nature of the construction, i.e. a municipal airport, that
a government project was involved which by law must
be bonded.
The allegations of defendant Kent Hoyt contained
in his Affidavit made a part of the Motion for Summary
Judgment (R.16-18) do not raise an express or implied
in law contract obligating plaintiff in any way. The de·
livery of an assignment from the debtor, M & S, to the
contractor does not, in the absence of an acceptance by
the contractor, raise any obligation from the contractor
to the assignee. USA for the use of Henry Walke v. Van
De Riet, et al, (4th Cir. 1963) 316 F. 2d 912 and USA
for the use of ]. A. F.A-wards e5 Co., Inc. v. Thompson
Construction Corp., (2d Cir. 1959) 273 F. 2d 873, cert.
den. 362 U.S. 951, 80 S. C. 864, 4 L. Ed. 2d 869, 78 ALR
2d 421. Any representation that money would be received
•
· te
by Hoyt the following
day (R.17) does not consutu
an obligation absent further consideration. That repre~
sentation, which may be deemed as true for the purpos~
of this appeal, was based only on the assignment hande
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Mr. Jack Whiting by defendant Kent Hoyt, and was made
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prior to the knowledge of said Jack Whiting that all of the
accounts of M & S had been previously assigned to the
Clearfield State Bank on October 9, 1963 (R.2). The
assignment from M & S to Hoyt was, therefore, invalid
and not sufficient to support any kind of obligation
against Whiting Brothers. We further emphasize that
Hoyt's discussion with Mr. Whiting took place on December 5, 1963, before his claim was fully due, since he claims
rentals up to December 17, 1963. Under the holding in
USA for use of Henry Walke v. Van De Riet, et al, supra,
notice before the claim is due is premature and of no effect.
Defendant Smith has had little contact with plaintiff
and makes no allegations which would even suggest any
contractual obligation of plaintiff to defendant Smith,
other than the effect of the letter of December 26, 1963,
which matter has already been disposed of. Defendant
Smith's Affidavit admits Mr. Whiting told him on December 5, 1963, that plaintiff was bonded (R.22). This was
an affirmative "red flag" which should have prompted
Smith to give the statutory written notice if, in fact, Smith
intended to look to plaintiff or the surety for payment.
His ninety day period would have expired about December 24, 1963, and sufficient time remained for him to file
his notice following receipt of actual knowledge that the
iob was bonded. His failure to do so defeats his own claim.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff submits that the court below erroneously
interpreted the legal implications of the undisputed facts
in the record, and particularly the effect of the letter
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from plaintiff's Las Vegas counsel. The governing statutes and judicial decisions discussed above, as applied to
the facts, clearly demonstrate that defendants Hoyt and
Smith are not entitled to judgment against plaintiff for
the following reasons:
( 1) Defendants did not give written notice to
plaintiff of their respective unpaid claims within ninety
days after furnishing the last labor or materials as required
by 40 U.S.C.A. Section 270b;
(2) The letter of December 26, 1963, from plaintiff's Las Vegas counsel to defendants did not mislead
them or induce them not to give written notice, but
warned them of the necessity of protecting their rights;
( 3) Defendant Smith did not receive said letter
of December 26, 1963, until after his ninety day filing
period had expired;
( 4) Defendant Hoyt presented an alleged assignment from the subcontractor prior to the maturity of his
claim, and no sufficient notice to plaintiff can be implied
therefrom, the validity of the assignment is otherwise not
shown.
(5) Defendants Hoyt and Smith have no express
or implied contract with plaintiff.
Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities,
plaintiff urges this court to reverse the judgments ren·
dered by the lower court with instruction that defenda~ts
Hoyt and Smith shall have no claim or right of action
against the plaintiff or its surety.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
DON B. ALLEN

